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EvrnENCE - CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - UsE OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES - The recent efforts on the part of
state legislatures to increase the effectiveness of their criminal codes
has resulted in extending the use of the statutory presumption to new
fields of criminal law. The reaction which necessarily follows such an
innovation upon traditional practice has appeared in the form of renewed attacks upon the constitutionality of the device, accompanied
by the usual expressions of alarm concerning the "threat to liberty"
that lurks in the use of this "mechanistic" instrument of "arbitrary
oppression." 1
Nowhere has the statutory presumption been more thoroughly
examined than in New York. Much of the current discussion as well
as the litigation in that state has involved a presumption created in the
penal code to the effect that "The presence in an automobile, other
than a public omnibus, of ... a pistol ... shall be presumptive evidence
of its illegal possession by all the persons found in such automobile at
the time such weapon, instrument, or appliance is found." 2 This legislation is of particular interest because it has recently been both attacked
and supported by the courts in the state of its origin. Furthermore, it
may properly serve as a typical example of a statutory presumption in
the following analysis of the constitutionality and desirability of the
device as used in modern criminal procedure.

1 O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," 11 ST. JoHNS L. REV.
167 (1937). Granting that dangers may exist, some of the exhortations certainly
remind one of Chief Justice Cockburn's statement that a danger may be "of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely
possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence
his conduct." Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861).
2 39 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), "Penal Law,"§ 1898-a.
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I.

The presumption under consideration has been a part of the New
York Penal Law only since 1936. Long before that time the legislature
had enacted a statute making illegal the mere possession of a concealed
weapon without a license,8 and this provision had been upheld by the
New York courts/ Illegal possession had been further interpreted to
include not only actual but also constructive possession. 5 But the statute
as a practical matter proved unenforceable in certain situations where
it was most necessary that it be enforced. If a violator happened to be
in an automobile with other occupants, he could successfully avoid
prosecution by keeping his weapon on the floor of the car, for in case
of apprehension by a police officer, all the occupants could deny knowledge and possession of the weapon. The state, having the burden of
proof, could proceed no further. The typical attitude of the courts
where prosecution was attempted is indicated by the following statement from People v. Di Landri: 6
"It cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the revolver which was found on the floor of the car belonged to the
defendant or was in his constructive possession rather than in the
possession of one of the other occupants of the car. The defendant's
guilt, therefore, was not established beyond a reasonable doubt."
The impossibility of enforcing the illegal possession statute against
the modern gangster was apparent. Perhaps in the light of a presumption statute which had been for years a part of the New Jersey Code,'
one of the supreme court judges was finally inspired to declare:
8

"Any person over the age of sixteen years, who shall have in his possession in
any city, village, or town of this state, any pistol, revolver, or other firearm of a size
which may be concealed upon the person, without a written license therefor, issued to
him as hereinafter prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and if he has been
previously convicted of any crime he shall be guilty of a felony." 39 N. Y. Consol.
Laws (McKinney, 1938), "Penal Law," § 1897 (4).
"It was argued in People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397 at 401-402, 97 N. E. 877
(1912), that to declare mere possession of a weapon a crime is a denial of due process
of law. The court held, however, that "The legislature has the undoubted power to
declare that various acts, not theretofore so, shall be criminal without proof of other
intent as a necessary ingredient of the offense than the intent to commit the prohibited act."
5
People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of City Prison, 154 App. Div. 413, 139
N. Y. S. 277 (1913); People v. Persce, 204 N. Y. 397 at 402, 97 N. E. 877 (1912).
In the latter case the court said that the provision "must mean a possession which
places the weapon within the immediate control and reach of the accused and where
it is available for unlawful use if he so desires."
11
250 App. Div. 52, 293 N. Y. S. 546 (1937). See also People v. Maiorano,
262 N. Y. 457, 188 N. E. 18 (1933); People v. King, 216 App. Div. 240, 214

N. Y. S. 537 (1926).
1
New Jersey Rev. Stat. (1937), § 2:i76-7. Although the statute was enacted in
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"The cases construing the word 'possession? under section 1897
of the Penal Law make conviction impossible unless there is shown
which occupant of the automobile possessed the pistol, and this
notwithstanding the fact that its presence in an automobile makes
it available for instant use by any of its occupants. • .. I am compelled therefore, to discharge the relators. This, and similar cases,
establishes the urgent need for legislation making the presence
of a forbidden firearm in an automobile or other vehicle presumptive evidence of its possession by all the occupants thereof. Such
an amendment would require the occupants of an automobile to
explain the presence of the firearm and enable the court to fix the
criminal responsibility for its possession." 8
The legislature ultimately responded to the need, and the statutory
presumption quoted in the introduction above was enacted.
2.

In the course of its uncertain existence this statutory presumption
has twice been declared unconstitutional and has twice been upheld in
the lower courts of New York. 0 The Court of Appeals has not as yet
had the question of the presumption's constitutionality squarely presented.10 There have been numerous bases for attack upon the New
York statute, all of which might be advanced in any criminal case
where the prosecution attempts to use a presumption to aid in establishing the defendant's guilt. Of these arguments, six are worthy of consideration in some detail.

(a)
The first contention is that a statutory presumption amounts to an
arbitrary declaration by the legislature of the guilt of the accused without requiring actual proof.11 This argument is ineffective because it
1898, it seems never to have been interpreted by a court of last resort. It provides that
"The presence of a firearm in a vehicle is presumptive evidence of possession by all
persons occupying or using the vehicle at the time."
8 People eX rel. De Feo v. Warden of City Prison, 136 Misc. 836, 241 N. Y. S.
63 (1930).
9 A vigorous declaration of the statute's invalidity appears in People ex rel Dixon
v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N. Y. S. 191 (1937), which overruled the decision
of the lower court upholding the statute in 160 Misc. 327, 290 N. Y. S. 284 (1936).
Following the appellate division's reasoning is People v. Pinder, 170 Misc. 345, 9
N. Y. S. (2d) 3II (1938). In a later phase of this case, however, the presumption
was upheld. People v. Burt, 171 Misc. 166, II N. Y. S. (2d) 465 (1939).
10 People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N. Y. S. 191 (1937),
was appealed, but the court of appeals in a memorandum decision found that the
indictment failed to state a crime. It was therefore unnecessary to pass upon the issue
of constitutionality. 276 N. Y. 613, 12 N. E. (2d) 603 (1938).
11
People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N. Y. S. 191 (1937);
People v. Pinder, 170 Misc. 345, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 3II (1938).
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assumes that the presumption is conclusive, i.e., that presence of a
weapon is synonomous with possession. Actually the legislature has only
said that presence may be considered as evidence of possession until
the defendant has spoken. To argue that there would be no proof is
to deny the validity of circumstantial evidence.

(b)
It has also been maintained that the legislature is at least imparting
probative force to the facts.12 Apparently this argument originated as an
analogy to the rule that the judge is not permitted to influence the
jury by commenting upon the facts or otherwise intimating his own
views. Aside from the fact that the rule as applied to the judge is of
questionable value,18 the claim of legislative persuasion is certainly
distinguishable. The statute merely lays down a general rule to apply
to all cases of a certain type, indicating in advance of litigation the legislative approval of a jury's finding that one fact exists when another
exists. The jury might so find without the statute; but again they might
want to so find and yet be in doubt as to whether or not their verdict
would be sustained by a judge whose convictions differed from theirs.
The presumption assures the jury that if they are convinced of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt their verdict will be sustained.
(c)
It has been claimed that the presumption deprives the accused of
his right to a trial by jury, since it compels the jury to find the fact
presumed. This contention is seldom seen in the modern cases, but it
occasionally finds support elsewhere. For example, one law review
writer declares that the theory of circumstantial evidence is to influence
juries while the prima facie case established by a presumption is designed to compel them.1' If the presumption were conclusive, i.e., if it
were a presumption of law, then the statement would be true; but a
statute such as the one under consideration involves only a rebuttable
presumption, i.e., a presumption of fact. The latter in a criminal case
merely indicates that legal effect may be given to certain evidence under
particular circumstances. It amounts to a declaration that an inference
of guilt is permissible and reasonable after the state has proved certain
facts; but the jury is left free to determine the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant in its discretion. The burden of proof remains
People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N. Y. S. 191 (1937).
30 MtcH. L. REV. 1303 (1932); Hogan, "The Strangled Judge," 14 J. AM.
Juo. Soc. II6 (1930); Sunderland, "The Inefficiency of the American Jury," 13
M1cH. L. REV. 302 (1915).
H O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," I I ST. JoHNS L. REV.
167 at 173 (1937).
12

19
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at all times on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty. The statute only establishes a rule of
evidence which places the burden of going forward with the proof
upon the defendant after the prosecution has established a prima facie
case. The jury is in no way compelled to reach a verdict. It may still
disregard the presumption, even though the defendant fails to offer
any evidence at all.15
(d)
Another contention is that the presumption removes the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by compelling the defendant to testify. This argument has often been advanced but is seldom
sustained by the courts. 111 The somewhat technical answer is that the
defendant is not "compelled," since it is possible that he will still be
acquitted, even though he fails to introduce evidence. In other words,
a defendant's failure to introduce evidence is a gamble in any case, and
a presumption merely increases his risk.
As a practical matter, if the defendant fails to speak the jury will
generally convict on the strength of the presumption and the silence
of the defendant.17 But in order to ascertain the truth, it is often essential to have the defendant's testimony, especially where the facts are
peculiarly within his own knowledge.18 If the defendant can be "induced" by a ·presumption, without being "compelled" (in the constitutional sense) to take the stand, the result would seem to justify the
not implausible reasoning which makes possible a circumvention of the
constitutional barrier.

(e)
It is often argued that the application of a statutory presumption in
a criminal case modifies the presumption of innocence 19 and shifts the
15 Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray (72 Mass.) l (1856). Perhaps the clearest
explanation of a presumption of fact is found in People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32 at 4344, 34 N. E. 759 (1893), where the court said: "A provision of this kind does not
take away or impair the right of trial by jury. • •• It, in substance, enacts that, certain facts being proved, the jury may regard them, if believed, as sufficient to convict,
in the absence of explanation or contradiction. Even in that case, the court could not
legally direct a conviction. It cannot do so in any criminal case. That is solely for the
jury, and it could have the right, after a survey of the whole case, to refuse to convict
unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, even though
statutory prima facie evidence were uncontradicted."
18 Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14 (1908); State v.
Humphrey, 42 S. D. 512, 176 N. W. 39 (1920).
17
28 CoL. L. REV. 489 at491 (1928).
18 Chamberlain, "Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney," 14
A. B. A. J. 287 (1928).
19 The presumption of innocence affords protection "which from time immemorial
the law has thrown around a person accused of crime." Dodson v. United States,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1928) 23 F. (2d) 401 at 402. But in spite of this peculiar sanctity the
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burden of proof to the defendant. No intelligent appraisal of the merits
of this argument can be attempted until the ambiguity surrounding the
terms "presumption of innocence" and "burden of proof'' have been
removed.
It is necessary at the outset to understand that the terms merely
represent two ways of stating the same thing. More specifically, one is
the parallel or corollary of the other. They are somewhat analogous
to a right of one party and a commensurate duty of the other in ordinary civil litigation. The presumption of innocence on one side is a right
or privilege of the accused. It is paralleled on the other side by the corresponding obligation of the prosecution to sustain the burden of proof.
Furthermore, one is the necessary concomitant of the other. Just as
the existence of a right implies the existence of a correlative duty, so
the existence of a presumption of the defendant's innocence implies the
existence of the state's burden of proof. Likewise, an alteration of one
implies a proportionate alteration of the other. Therefore, the lawyer
must be on his guard whenever he finds decisions or text books which
make unqualified statements to the effect that shifting the burden of
proof has no bearing upon the presumption of innocence--or that impairing the presumption of innocence is a violation of due process but
shifting the burden of proof is not. He may be sure that when declarations such as these are made, the words are used in different senses and
that his authority may or may not have been aware of the equivocation.
The ambiguity in the phrase "burden of proof'' is widely recognized.20 It may mean (I) the burden of introducing or going forward
presumption has been severely criticized. One writer declares that it is "misleading
and has no proper place in the administration of justice." Benedict, "The Presumption
of Innocence," I N. Y. L. REV. 442 at 444 (1923). In 90 JuST. P. 269 at 270
(1926), an "American writer'' is quoted as challenging the presumption of innocence
in this way: "The treatment of the prisoner itself negatives the presumption. If he is
presumed innocent, why is he manacled? Why is he put in gaol? Why is he let out
only on bail? Why, when he is put on trial, is he put in the dock? Why does he not
have a place with the bystanders, who are simply presumed innocent? The 'presumption' in the presence of such things is a contradiction of terms. How can a person be
presumed innocent who is presumably gui!ty? The fact that he is restrained of his
liberty presumes guilt." The English writer answered by saying that the unfavorable
appearances are inherently necessary and that it is in order to offset the effect of these
adverse circumstances that the presumption is used.
Certainly the rnle is not founded upon logical grounds. "The truth is that,
although the law pays a prisoner the compliment of supposing him to be wrongly
accused, it nevertheless knows very well that the probabilities are in favor of the prosecutor's accusation being well founded ••••" DARI.ING, Sc1NTJLLAE JURIS 28 (1877)
[5th ed., 43 (1903) ], cited in 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., 504 (1923).
20 5 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed.,§§ 2485, 2487 (1923); Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof," 68 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 307 (1920); Ray, "Burden of Proof and Presumptions," 13 TEX. L. REV.
33 (1934). ·
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with the evidence, or ( 2) the burden of persuading the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. It is seldom pointed out,
however, that the parallel term, "presumption of innocence," has
exactly the same ambiguous connotation.21 Thus it may mean (I) that
the defendant is presumed innocent and therefore may remain inactive
and secure until the prosecution has established a prima facie case, i.e.,
until the state has introduced sufficient evidence to insure its cause
against a directed verdict for the defendant, or ( 2) that the defendant
is presumed innocent until the prosecution has sustained its burden of
persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
The parallel still exists between the first meaning of "burden of proof''
and "presumption of innocence," and a like parallel exists between the
second meaning of each. The confusion arises only by using or interpreting "burden of proof" in sense (I) as a corollary of "presumption
of innocence" in sense (2), or by considering "burden of proof" in
sense ( 2) as a parallel term of "presumption of innocence" in sense (I).
Having once resolved the ambiguity, it is possible to reconcile or
distinguish the outwardly conflicting statements in the books regarding
the presumption of the defendant's innocence and the prosecution's
burden of proof. Most important for the purposes of this discussion is
a consideration of the apparent conflict concerning the requirements of
due process.22 One reputable authority denies that a modification of the
presumption of innocence is a violation of the due process guaranty.28
21 Wigmore seems to be one of the few- writers to recognize the distinction, and
he mentions it only incidentally when he states that "it is to be noted that the 'presumption of innocence' is in truth merely another form of expression for a part of the
accepted rule for the burden of proof in criminal cases, i.e. the rule that it is for the
prosecution to adduce evidence • • • and to produce persuasion beyond a reasonable
doubt.•••" 5 WmMoRE, EvtDENCE, 2d ed., § 25n (1923). The typical treatment
is illustrated by the following excerpts. Benedict, "The Presumption of Innocence,"
I N. Y. L. REv. 442 (1923), states that "the so-called presumption [of innocence]
is nothing more than a mode of statement of the fundamental proposition that the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused." On the
other hand in Culpepper v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. IOJ at n9, 111 P. 679 at 685 (1910),
the court says, "The presumption of innocence fulfilled its purpose when it required the
state to go forward with its evidence and establish a prima facie case." In each instance
the authority was only half right because it failed to recognize the other meaning which
is inherent in the term.
22 It is important to recognize that there is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States expres.~ly requiring that the defendant be presumed innocent until
the state has sustained the burden of proving him guilty. No statistical survey of the
state constitutions has been made, but it may be stated as a general rule that they do
not contain specific references to the subject. The only question of constitutionality,
therefore, involves the requirements of the due process provision.
28 "The idea that the presumption of innocence has become, in this country, a
constitutional right has never taken serious hold." I JoNES, EvtoENCE, 2d ed., 87
(1926).
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On the other hand, statements in the cases generally point to the opposite conclusion.2~ Although seemingly irreconcilable, such statements
may consistently stand together if it is recognized that the first refers
to the presumption of innocence as defined in sense (I) while the
second pertains to the presumption as described in sense ( 2). If by
modification of the presumption of innocence a writer means that the
defendant can no longer safely remain secure and inactive after the
prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case, then it is certainly correct to say that no question of due process
is raised. If, on the other hand, by modification of the presumption of
innocence, a writer refers to an authorization which permits the jury
to find the defendant's guilt without being persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, then clearly it is correct to say that due process in such a
case is denied.
The same confusion in definition has resulted in conflicting statements with regard to the burden of proof, although the ambiguity here
is more often recognized. Scores of decisions flatly declare that the burden of proof may be shifted to the defendant, and statutes have generally been upheld even though they expressly cast the burden of
proof upon the accused. 25 On the other hand, due process is widely
declared to require the state to sustain the burden of proof throughout
the trial. 28 The explanation, of course, lies in the fact that the burden
of proof in the sense of going forward with the evidence may be shifted
without violating due process,27 while the burden of proof in the sense
M "American law accords an accused the presumption of innocence, and due process
of law requires that, before a conviction be had, this presumption must be removed
by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Licavoli, 264
Mich. 643 at 655, 250 N. W. 520 (1933). See also Wyneharner v. People, 13 N. Y.
378 at 446 (1856); State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 2II (1881); In re Wong Hane, 108
Cal. 680, 41 P. 693 (1895); Hammond v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15, 84 N. E. 416
(1908); State v. Grimmett, 33 Idaho 203, 193 P. 380 (1920).
25 "The Constitution of Montana contains no guaranty that the burden of proof
may not be shifted in a criminal action, unless it may be considered as implied in the
'due process of law' clause or the guaranty that a person accused of crime shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Neither of these clauses would appear to
prohibit the enactment of such rule of evidence." State v. Lewis, 67 Mont. 447 at 452~
216 P. 337 (1923).
28 "To convict an accused by due process of law, there must be a conformity to
established and fundamental rules respecting the presumption of innocence, the burden
and degree of proof, and the competency of evidence••••" 16 C. J. S. n81 (1939).
27 "It is true, then, that presumptions 'shift the burden of proof,' in a familiar
sense of that phrase, importing the duty of going forward in the argument, or in the
giving of evidence. That is the only sense of the 'burden of proof,' in which, having
once been fixed, it can ever shift." THAYER, EVIDENCE, 383 (1898). But see State
v. Lapointe, 81 N. H. 227 at 235, 123 A. 692 (1924), where the court said: "The
rule of the constitution is that the defendant in a criminal case cannot be compelled to
go forward •••• Neither the burden of proof nor the burden of proceeding with any
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of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt can never be shifted.28
With the foregoing analysis in mind, it is clear that in order to
sustain an argument that a statutory presumption violates due process
by impairing the presumption of innocence or by shifting the burden
of proof, it prnst be shown that the statutory presumption makes it
unnecessary to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to authorize conviction of an accused without proof of any facts whatsoever. 2 g
A presumption statute, however, ordinarily requires actual proof of
certain facts by the prosecution before a presumption is raised. The
statute merely takes the case to the jury and indicates that from the
evidence introduced by the prosecution the jurors are permitted to infer
the guilt of the defendant if they so desire. In a criminal case the statute
really does no more than to declare that the facts upon which the presumption is based constitute competent circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.30 The burden of persuasion beyond
a reasonable doubt still rests upon the prosecution.
Superficially it might seem that a presumption of the defendant's
innocence cannot co-exist with a presumption of the defendant's guilt,
even though the latter does not arise until certain basic facts have been
proved. But it must be remembered that the presumptions are not conclusive. They merely represent a legislative permit to the jury to make
an inductive inference one way or the other.
But even though these presumptions are mere permissive inferences
and are not conclusive, if a presumption of innocence and a presumption
of guilt happened to rest upon exactly the same facts, they would be
conflicting and would only confuse the jury without serving any useful
purpose. However, the presumption of innocence arises from the fact
of common knowledge that most men do not commit crime, while a
statutory presumption arises out of certain facts which the prosecution
must prove. Thus these presumptions may co-exist throughout the
trial, since they merely present alternatives for th~ jury's choice. To
allow simultaneous existence of a presumption of guilt and a presumption of innocence based upon different facts is no more inconsistent
evidence to prove such case can be imposed upon the party charged with crime." The
court admitted that there are an "array of cases" contra.
28 5 W1cMORE, EvmENCE, 2d ed., § 2489 (1923). But see 48 HARV. L. REV.
102 (1934); Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof," 68 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); Morgan, "Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions," 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931).
27 McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498
(1915).
30 North, J., dissenting in People v. Licavoli, 264 Mich. 643 at 661, 250 N. W.
520 (1933).
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than to permit the introduction of conflicting competent evidence by
the opposing parties in any law suit, civil or criminal.
In view of the ambiguity in meaning considered above, it is understandable that the arguments concerning modificatfon of the presumption of innocence and shifting the burden of proof are almost universally advanced whenever a statutory presumption is attacked. Few if
any presumptions, however, are fatally defective in denying due process, since they seldom interfere with the defendant's constitutional
right to have the jury persuaded of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(f)
Any presumption may be attacked because a natural or a rational
connection is lacking between the fact proved and the fact presumed.
This is the argument most often relied upon by the courts in declaring
a statutory presumption unconstitutional.81 As an original proposition
the soundness of a rationality requirement might well be questioned.
Professor Wigmore has criticized the whole theory as unnecessary and
undesirable. In his treatise on Evidence, he writes:
"It has occasionally been suggested that these legislative rules
of presumption, or any legislative rules of evidence, must be tested
by the standard of rationality, and are invalid if they fall short of
it. But this cannot be conceded. If the Legislature can make a rule
of Evidence at all, it cannot be controlled by a judicial standard of
rationality, any more than its economic fallacies can be invalidated
by the judicial conceptions of economic truth. Apart from the
Constitution, the Legislature is not obliged to obey either the
axioms of logic or the axioms of economic science. • •• So long as
the party may exercise his freedom to introduce evidence, and the
jurors may exercise their freedom to weigh it rationally, no
amount of irrational legislation can change the result." 82
In spite of Professor Wigmore's argument, the courts have unanimously adopted the "rational connection" requirement as an element
of due process of law.83 Two possible reasons for the rule have been
suggested.H In the first place, when a presumption is used, the court
cannot set aside a verdict of guilty on the ground that the verdict was
81
People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 464, 293 N. Y. S. 191 (1937);
People v. Pinder, 170 Misc. 345, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 3u (1928); 51 A. L. R. u39
at II41 (1927); 12 AM. JuR. 316 (1938).
32
2 W1cMoRE, EvmENCE, 2d ed., 1068-1069 (1923).
88
People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893); Mobile, J. & K. C.
R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136 (1910); Manley v. Georgia, 279
U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 215 (1928); Brosman, "The Statutory Presumptions," 5 TULANE
L. REv. 178 at 184-189 (1931).
u 30 M1cH. L. REv. 600 at 605-606 (1932).
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not supported by sufficient evidence. In the second place, when the
jury is instructed as to a presumption, they undoubtedly attach some
weight to the facts upon which the presumption is based which would
not be carried by the facts in and of themselves.
The meaning of the courts' requirement that there be a rational and.
natural conn~ction between the fact upon which the presumption is to
rest and the main fact which is presumed, is perhaps best understood
through illustration. The following hypothetical situation was suggested by Lumpkin, J., in a Georgia case: 85
"If the legislature should declare that every man found wearing
a straw hat in September should be presumed to have committed
any forgery which took place in that month, such an act would be
invalid, because there is no rational connection between forgery
and wearing a straw hat, and the presumption would be purely
arbitrary."
Another example, nearly as absurd as this imaginary situation, is an
actual Georgia statute passed in connection with the banking act of that
state. The legislature declared that "every insolvency of a bank shall be
deemed fraudulent, and the president and directors shall be severally
punished by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary ••• provided
that the defendant ... may repel the presumption of fraud." 88 Professor
Wigmore would, of course, deny the power of a court to invalidate such
a statute, because it provides an opportunity to the defendant to rebut
the presumption, and because the jury theoretically will take account
of the irrationality before they arrive at a verdict. As might be supposed, however, the Supreme Court of the United States followed the
great weight of authority and held the statute unconstitutional as a
violation of the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.81
Since the courts so universally make "rationality'' a prerequisite to
a presumption's validity, how may a compliance wit.Ji the standard be
recognized in any particular case? The most thorough analysis indicates three possible tests.88
The first, the pragmatic test, emphasizes the object to be attained
and the evil to be eradicated. Thus if the presumption serves a desirGriffen v. State, 142 Ga. 636 at 639, 83 S. E. 540 (1914).
Ga. Banking Act, art. 20, § 28, Ga. Laws (1919), p. 219.
8 '1' Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. I, 49 S. Ct. 215 (1928). It is interesting to note
that about the same time the New York legislature passed an identical statute [39 N. Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), "Penal Law," § 297 ], which was declared unconstitutional on the same ground as the statute in the Manley case. People v. Mancuso,
255 N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177 (1931).
88 O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," I I ST. JoHNS L.
REV. 167 (1937).
85

88

COMMENTS

377

able purpose and is not considered directly harmful to society, it is held
to be reasonable. Opponents of this view argue that the pragmatic test
should not be considered, since it would leave legislative discretion
virtually unlimited. They say that without further restriction it would
still be possible for legislatures to enact irrational presumptions whose
application would tend to destroy the protection to liberty and against
the tyranny of government afforded by our constitutional system.89
However, even if the pragmatic test were to be made the exclusive
criterion of rationality, it would not be as far-reaching as Professor
Wigmore's suggestion that no rebuttable presumption, regardless of
irrationality, is a violation of due process. The "dangers" of this test
are certainly not so "insurmountable" as to justify excluding it entirely.
On the other hand, it need not be made the exclusive or all-important
factor in determining whether or not the rationality requirement has
been met.
The second is the a priori or ingrediency test. Apparently the proponents of this criterion would require that the fact upon which the
presumption is based be one of the ingredients of the crime which is
presumed.4° Just what is meant by "ingredient" is nowhere to be found.
If the common meaning, viz., a component part, constituent, or element:1 is applied, it would seem that beyond question the test is satisfied where the presence of a weapon in an automobile is declared to
give rise to a presumption that one of the occupants of the car is guilty
of the crime of illegal possession. Certainly the presence or proximity
of a thing is an ingredient of the possession of that thing. The fallacy of
Professor O'Toole's contention that the New York statute fails to meet
the ingrediency test' 2 lies in his assumption that illegality and possession are the only ingredients of the crime presumed and that neither
element has to be proved in any case where the presumption is applied.
Illegality is not an ingredient requiring proof, because the penal code 48
expressly makes illegal the possession of a weapon without a license.
Possession, on the other hand, is more than an ingredient; it is the
crime itself. The ingredients of possession are (I) physical control and
( 2) intent to exercise that control!' The prosecution still has to prove
Ibid., 171-172.
Ibid., 180, 187.
41 5 OXFORD DICTIONARY 289 (1901).
42 O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," 11 ST. JoHNS L.
REV. 167 (1937). See his general criticism of the presumption in question at pages
184-185.
48 39 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), § 1897 (4), quoted in note 3 supra.
44 BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 18-21 (1936). By "intent to exercise physical
control" the writer does not mean the intent to use. There is a real difference between
an intent to use or operate a deadly weapon and an intent to exercise dominion over it
as a latent instrument. Only in the latter sense is intent an ingredient of possession as
89
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the element of physical control; only the element of intent to control
is presumed. Thus it is clear that the a priori or ingrediency test is
fully satisfied by the presumption, since the fact out of which the presumption flows, viz., the physical control of the weapon by the occupants of the car, in itself constitutes an ingredient of the crime charged.
):'he third test listed by O'Toole is termed the a posteriori or experience test and is defined in this way: "Does our experience demonstrate that the fact presumed is usually co-existent with the fact from
which the presumption flows?''4 5 The author emphasizes the importance of exercising great care in the application of this test to distinguish
between what experience has shown us to be merely related and what
experience has shown us to be rarely separated. In support of this
distinction the famous Turnipseed case 46 is cited as authority; but
neither that case nor any of those which adopt the experience test of
rationality have recognized such a distinction. On the contrary, the
Supreme Court in the Turnipseed case required only that there be
"some rational connection" between the fact proved and the fact presumed and that it be not "so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate." 47 In fact, the presumption itself in the Turnipseed case indicates that the fact proved and the fact presumed need be only "related" in experience and not "rarely separated" as contended, since the
Court found that injury to persons or property by railroads has such
a rational connection with negligent operation of those railroads that a
statutory presumption to that e:ffect was constitutional.48
The test of experience set up by the courts seems to require nothing
more than a relationship which is probable or likely to exist. This test,
then, like the other tests of rationality already examined is satisfied by
the presumption in section I898-a of the New York Penal Law. Consequently the requirement of rationality is fully met.
Six possible bases for attack upon the validity of a statutory presumption have been considered. The arguments that there is no actual
the term is used; in § 1897 (4) of the Penal Law. Possession with intent to use is
expr~c;ly made a distinct crime in subdivision 1 of the same section of the statute.
45 O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," 1 I ST. JoHNS L.
REV. 167 at 172-173 (1937).
46 Mobile, J. & K. C.R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136 (1910).
47 Ibid., 219 U. S. at 43.
48 Presumptions have been upheld in numerous cases when experience would show
that the fact proved is only occasionally a basis for finding the existence of the fact
presumed. For instance in People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 199 N. E. 495 (1936), it
was held that experience indicates a rational connection between the defendant's consorting with criminals and consorting with those criminals for an unlawful purpose. A
presumption of the latter fact was declared justified upon proof of the former. Statutes
have been upheld making the keeping of liquor prima facie evidence of intent to sell
it. Toole v. State, 170 Ala. 41, 54 So. 195 (1910); State v. Sheppard, 64 Kan. 451,
67 P. 870 (1902); State v. Cunningham, 25 Conn. 195 (1856).
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proof, that the burden of proof is shifted and the presumption of innocence is affected, that the legislature imparts probative force to the
evidence, and that there is no rational connection between proved and
presumed facts are all included within, or at least are allegedly a part
of, that vague body of law known as due process. The contentions that
the defendant is compelled to testify and that he is deprived of his right
of jury trial are, of course, covered by specific provisions in the federal
and state constitutions. Some of these arguments may have real merit
in particular cases; but it seems clear that they are ineffective against
the New York statute which declares that the presence in an automobile
of a pistol shall be presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by the
occupants of the vehicle.

3.
The use of the statutory presumption is, of course, not limited to
the particular type of situation covered by the New York statute. There
are numerous :fields in the criminal law where an urgent need for such
legislation exists. It is necessary not only for the effective enforcement
of state laws but also in aid of police regulation under local ordinances.
An important problem in this connection recently arose in the city of
Detroit. The city officials found it impossible to sustain convictions for
the violation of parking ordinances because of the difficulty of satisfactorily proving who had actually parked the car. The person who
returned to the automobile after the violation occurred was not necessarily the person who had parked it in the :first instance. This meant that
unless a vigilant policeman could positively testify as to the identity
of the driver on bbth occasions, the law was unenforceable. The impracticability of identifying every parking motorist as a potential violator of an ordinance is apparent.
·
In order to remedy the situation, the common council of Detroit
passed an ordinance 49 which provided that an owner of a vehicle was
presumed to be the operator of the same at the time of the violation of
a parking ordinance, unless he testified under oath that he was not
operating the vehicle at that time, and unless he either submitted himself to an examination as to the identity of the person who was operating
the vehicle or voluntarily revealed the identity of such person. The
ordinance was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
Michigan on the theory that the accused was restricted to the means
specified in the statute in rebutting the presumption. T.fiis was held
to compel the accused to be a witness in the proceedings brought against
him and to deprive him of due process.50
Detroit Ordinance No. n5-c, § 4 as amended by Ordinance No. 350-c.
People v. Hoogy, 277 Mich. 578, 269 N. W. 605 (1936). The court did not
indicate the phase of due process that was considered nor in what sense it was violated
or denied.
49

50
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After this decision violations were :flagrant, but again they remained
for the most part unpunished. Unless a police officer actually saw the
defendant park his car in the restricted area, the violator could escape
by merely maintaining (I) that the burden of proof was on the people
to show that he himself parked his car and ( 2) that the people had no
basis for inferring that he knew or allowed his car to be illegally parked.
Recognizing that the situation remained unaltered, the Detroit
common council acted again. 51 This time the ordinance merely provided that the registration plates displayed on an automobile parked
in violation of an ordinance should constitute in evidence a prima facie
presumption that the owner was the person who parked such motor
vehicle at the point where such violation occurred. The Supreme Court
of Michigan subsequently held that this ordinance was constitutional,52
although the usual arguments were advanced for its invalidity. Particular emphasis in the decision was placed upon the fact that a rational
connection exists between the ownership of an automobile together with
the license plates thereon and the actual use of the highways by the
owner in parking his car.

4.
The accused under the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence
is certainly given the benefit of every doubt. Whether the reason may
be wholly attributed to our basic ideas of justice and equity or whether
it is in part due to a peculiar concept of what is sporting and chivalrous,
it is outside the scope of this article to determine. The important thing
to consider here is the fact that without the use of a presumption in a
criminal prosecution, the state is deprived of its most valuable witness.
The defendant as a rule is the only person who knows the whole story.
The details of that story are often necessary in order to discover the
truth. Truth is one of the prerequisites to justice. Yet without the
defendant's testimony the truth may be unascertainable, and the prosecution may be helpless to proceed.
Bearing in mind the constitutional limitations already considered,
it is certainly possible as well as highly desirable for the legislatures to
render "first aid" to the district attorney by the use of the statutory
presumption in order that the best interests of society may prevail over
the interests of the criminal. 58 This is indeed a proper place for the
application of a rule of trial convenience which induces the defendant to
divulge facts that are essential to a discovery of the truth and yet which
are, by the very nature of the criminal act, peculiarly within his own
Detroit Comp. Ordinances, c. 196, § 65b.
People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N. W. 248 (1938).
53 See Chamberlain, ''Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney," 14
A. B. A. J. 287 (1928).
51
52
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knowledge. The Supreme Court of the United States has approved such
a rule. In Casey v. United States"' Justice Holmes said:
"It is consistent with all the constitutional protections of accused
men to throw on them the burden of proving facts peculiarly
within their knowledge and hidden from discovery by the Government."
It has been suggested that the statutory presumption lightens the
duty of a district attorney who may be too indolent to discover the
available evidence."11 The criticism has some validity and indicates a
limitation beyond which the legislature should not venture. 116 Even
where not restricted by constitutional sanctions, the enactment and
use of criminal presumption statutes should remain the exception and
not the rule. Only in those situations where the defendant has peculiar
and exclusive knowledge of the facts is such a statute necessary. Where
that is the case, however, an application of a proper presumption will
aid in ascertaining the truth and in better serving the ends of justice.
Edward M. Watson

"' 276 U. S. 413 at 418, 48 S. Ct. 373 (1927). See also People ex rel. Dixon v.
Lewis, 160 Misc. 327, 290 N. Y. S. 284 (1936); People v. Nuce, 34 Hun. (N. Y.)
298 (1884).
H O'Toole, "Artificial Presumptions in the Criminal Law," 11 ST. JoHNS L. REv.
167 (1937).
r.e Justice Cardozo, speaking for the court in Morrison v. California, 291 U. S.
82 at 88-89, 54 S. Ct. 281 (1933), said: "The limits are in substance these, that the
state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to
repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden
will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship
or oppression."

